In 2023, public research described vulnerability exploitation code and dynamically delivered DEX files associated with an Android app. I wanted to see which system capabilities this code attempted to use. I put the original article together in a hurry and did not examine all the code closely. The walkthrough remains here, with corrections based on the screenshots and AOSP source. The original references follow:
- Deep Blue Insight: The Most “Unpardonable” Vulnerabilities of 2022
- XXX apk embedded privilege escalation code and dynamic delivery dex analysis
- History of Android Deserialization Vulnerability Attack and Defense
Security is not my specialty. For background, see History of Android Deserialization Vulnerability Attack and Defense. This article does not reproduce the exploit chain or treat an API call as proof of root access.
Historical case; technical review: 2026-10-14. This article examines material published in 2023, not the current app or every vendor device. The source repository uses APK version 6.49 as an example. This article does not establish each DEX file’s full delivery history, execution identity, device OS version, or security patch level. Screenshots show attempted operations; they do not by themselves prove successful execution, collection of particular user data, or transmission. Vendor interfaces remain historical observations with unverified current applicability.
“System permissions” is not a single switch. Preinstallation, privileged-app status, platform signing, system UID, and root are different conditions. AOSP defines system UID as 1000 and root UID as 0. Operations still depend on Binder/Provider checks, AppOps, file access controls, and SELinux. Reflection and @SystemApi do not grant authority. See AOSP Process (Android 13), privileged permission allowlists, SELinux, and non-SDK interface restrictions.
Serialization and deserialization refer to the process of converting memory data structures into byte streams for network transmission or saving to disk, and then restoring the byte streams to memory objects. In the field of Web security, there have been many deserialization vulnerabilities, such as PHP deserialization, Java deserialization, etc. Because unexpected program logic is triggered during the deserialization process, attackers can use carefully constructed byte streams to trigger and exploit vulnerabilities to ultimately achieve goals such as arbitrary code execution.
This walkthrough examines decompiled screenshots of DEX files from the public repository. Their visible calls and targets fall into the categories below. Some capabilities are available to ordinary apps with user authorization; others require system or vendor privileges. These categories do not establish that every operation succeeded after privilege escalation.
- Changes to auto-start and associated-start settings, trying to enable them quietly or by default: another round of outsmarting phone manufacturers.
- Enable notification permissions.
- Listen to notification content.
- Query usage events, configuration files, or identifier fields, with results depending on the interface, permissions, and input.
- Modify system settings.
- Make some system permission tools for its own use.
The vendor-specific code for Huawei, Oppo, Vivo, and Xiaomi shows how much attention went into their different implementations. Phone manufacturers could learn something by studying this code too, this time to defend against it.
Finally, I also added user comments after this article was published on the WeChat official account, as well as the comment section of the Zhihu answer (the question has been deleted, but I can see it: How to evaluate Pinduoduo suspected of using vulnerabilities to attack user mobile phones, steal competitor software data, and prevent itself from being uninstalled? - Gracker’s answer - Zhihu https://www.zhihu.com/question/587624599/answer/2927765317, 2,471 likes as recorded when writing in 2023) which can be said to be mind-opening (regarding how Apps can do evil).
0. Dex File Information
I collected 37 DEX files from that repository. There were not many, and they were small enough to work through at a steady pace. The repository author describes dynamic delivery and lists historical CDN addresses. This article contains no independent packet capture establishing that every file was delivered or executed at each launch. Android source helps explain system behavior, but actual execution still requires call-chain and runtime evidence.

I used TTDeDroid and its showjar command to inspect DEX files. The original command below records that workflow; the samples were not executed for this review.
showjar 95cd95ab4d694ad8bdf49f07e3599fb3.dex
TTDeDroid defaults to jadx for decompilation. Executor classes are useful entry points, but their helpers and system-service calls also matter.

Decompilation can rename symbols, omit method bodies, or reconstruct control flow incorrectly. The discussion below is limited to visible code. Class names and code paths that report success are not evidence of a successful run.
1. Notification Listening and Notification Permission Related
1.1 Obtain Xiaomi Mobile Phone Notification Content
- File: 95cd95ab4d694ad8bdf49f07e3599fb3.dex
- Function: Get the user’s Active notifications
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.xm_ntf_info.XMGetNtfInfoExecutor
1. Reflectively get ServiceManager
The screenshot uses reflection to access ServiceManager.getService, then converts the Binder into a service-interface proxy. Obtaining a proxy does not mean the service will authorize subsequent calls.
2. Get detailed content of notifications through NotificationManagerService
The service name is notification, and the result is an INotificationManager proxy; the code does not pass the NotificationManagerService class to getService. It then attempts a hidden getActiveNotifications call, filters by a set of titles, and reads these fields:
- Title of the notification
- Package name of the App that generated the notification
- Notification sending time
- key
- channelID: the id of the channel this notification posts to.
Maybe some people don’t know what this thing is. The picture below shows a typical notification.

Its code is as follows
Distinguish the similarly named APIs. Public NotificationManager.getActiveNotifications() has returned the caller’s own active notifications since API 23; API 29 also includes notifications it posted as a delegate. The cross-app service interface shown here is different: Android 13’s implementation checks ACCESS_NOTIFICATIONS, AppOps, and user scope. The screenshot does not prove that the sample passed those checks.

Another path is a NotificationListenerService with notification access enabled by the user. This is distinct from an accessibility service. Using a system API does not establish that a plugin is compliant or safe, and an anti-revoke feature cannot necessarily recover every message. Android 15 (API 35) further restricts untrusted listeners’ access to unredacted notifications containing detected one-time passcodes; see Android 15 behavior changes. Old screenshots do not establish behavior on every newer system.
1.2. Open Notification Permissions on Xiaomi Phones (Push)
- File: 0fc0e98ac2e54bc29401efaddfc8ad7f.dex
- Function: Attempt to enable notifications for a specified package and query its package-level state.
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.xm_permission.XMPermissionExecutor
Handy, from the app’s point of view: ‘Naughty user. These notifications are for your own good. How could you turn them off? Let me quietly switch them back on for you.’
The code attempts setNotificationsEnabledForPackage. The service-side screenshot starts by checking the caller; Android 13 source uses enforceSystemOrSystemUI. Reflection alone cannot force this operation to succeed.
frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerService.java
The following query is areNotificationsEnabledForPackage, not another setter call. Its result describes package-level notification state, not visibility of every notification channel or delivery of network push messages.
frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerService.java
The other branch is named lbe (previously mistyped as leb) and accesses a MIUI permission-management Provider. Its authorization rules depend on the vendor version. Even that gets its own branch. Thorough!
1.3. Open Notification Permissions on Vivo Phones (Push)
- File: 2eb20dc580aaa5186ee4a4ceb2374669.dex
- Function: Attempt to enable notifications for an app on Vivo devices. Disabling notification display does not necessarily stop its network push connection.
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.vivo_open_push.VivoOpenPushExecutor
The screenshot attempts the notification-setting call discussed above. Android 13 (API 33) introduced the POST_NOTIFICATIONS runtime permission for posting non-exempt notifications, not receiving network messages. Old vendor behavior is not a general rule for Android 13 and later.

1.4 Open Notification Permissions on Oppo Phones
- File: 67c9e686004f45158e94002e8e781192.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.oppo_notification_ut.OppoNotificationUTExecutor
The method did not decompile completely. The visible fragment looks up ColorOS/OPlus notification-management Providers. Enabling notifications remains an inferred target, not a confirmed operation or result.

1.5 Notification Listener
- File: ab8ed4c3482c42a1b8baef558ee79deb.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.ud_notification_listener.UdNotificationListenerExecutor
The screenshot has listen and collect branches; the latter sends a collection broadcast and waits for a response. Which notifications and fields it collects depends on helpers not shown here.

Below is the framework’s onNotificationPosted callback declaration. It illustrates the mechanism, not the sample’s complete listener implementation.
I don’t know this part well either. Time to ask my wife, who has spent years working on SystemUI and Launcher… @ShiGong
1.6 App Notification Listener
- File: 4f260398-e9d1-4390-bbb9-eeb49c07bf3c.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.notification_listener.NotificationListenerExecutor
The one above is UdNotificationListenerExecutor, this one is NotificationListenerExecutor. What is UD?

This attempts to invoke a notification-listener authorization interface through reflection. @SystemApi identifies an API intended for particular system clients; it does not grant authority. In the Android 13 service, checkNotificationListenerAccess() checks system/phone identity or MANAGE_NOTIFICATION_LISTENERS, followed by user-choice and component checks. The sample’s two-argument call also differs from the three-argument framework screenshot; compatibility depends on the target version.


1.7 Open Notification Listener permissions on Huawei Phones
- File: a3937709-b9cc-48fd-8918-163c9cb7c2df.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.hw_notification_listener.HWNotificationListenerExecutor
The screenshot attempts to change notification access through a Huawei Settings Provider. Without that Provider’s versioned implementation and runtime results, acceptance of the request remains unverified.
1.8 Open Notification permissions on Huawei Phones
- File: 257682c986ab449ab9e7c8ae7682fa61.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.hw_permission.HwPermissionExecutor
The screenshot attempts to write Huawei/Honor notification-management Provider configuration. A success branch is not runtime proof; Provider authorization and the resulting state still need checking.

2. Backup Status
2.1. App Backup Status Related on HarmonyOS, for keeping alive?
- File: 6932a923-9f13-4624-bfea-1249ddfd5505.dex
- Function: Backup Related
I spent quite a while looking at this one. The screenshot first passes an IBackupSessionCallback to PackageManagerEx.startBackupSession, then attempts a backup task using the returned session ID. It does not wait for the callback before starting the session. This is a Huawei extension, not evidence of support across all HarmonyOS versions.


Here is the interface description I found at the time. A keep-alive purpose is unconfirmed; backup sessions, file operations, and process-lifetime effects need separate evidence.

2.2. Backup Status Related on Vivo Phones
- File: 8c34f5dc-f04c-40ba-98d4-7aa7c364b65c.dex
- Function: Backup Related
This image only shows the Binder interface definition of a Vivo backup/restore observer, not a backup invocation or runtime result.

3. File Related
3.1 File and SharedPreferences Operations in the Huawei Sample
- File: da03be2689cc463f901806b5b417c9f5.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.hw_get_input.HwGetInputExecutor
The screenshot attempts to copy a file specified by an input parameter, read it as SharedPreferences, and construct a response. The actual path and results are absent, so it does not establish access to keyboard input or all user data. Other apps’ private files remain subject to the application sandbox and other access controls. What did it want these contents for—data analysis? I wondered about that too, but the screenshot does not answer it.

Get SharedPreferences

The code below only creates a temporary .client_slog_cache/temp directory under the app’s own files directory. Calling it “Get slog” was inaccurate: this fragment does not read system logs.

4. User Data
4.1 Obtain data of user using mobile phone
- File: 35604479f8854b5d90bc800e912034fc.dex
- Function: Query usage events within a time window, then filter and collect package names, class names, timestamps, and event types.
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.usage_event_all.UsageEventAllExecutor
The service name is usagestats, not usagestates. The screenshot calls UsageStatsManager.queryEvents; its result is not a complete installed-app inventory or record of everything the user does. Ordinary apps can also query usage after a user grants usage access in Settings. The Android 13 service checks AppOps and, in its default mode, PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS. A client-side checkPermission call is not the service’s complete authorization decision.

The system defines Activity, foreground-service, screen-state, and other events, but the sample applies filters. An event’s presence in the enum does not establish that it was collected. Queries are limited by their time range and retention; the API documentation says events are kept for a few days and may return null while the user remains locked from Android 11 onward.
The mapping below is UserUsageStatsService.eventToString from Android 13 tag android-13.0.0_r1, previously mislabeled as UsageEvents.java. It is a server-side debugging helper that includes internal events, not a standalone public-SDK example.
1 | // AOSP android-13.0.0_r1 |
4.2 Obtain User Usage Data
- File: b50477f70bd14479a50e6fa34e18b2a0.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.usage_event.UsageEventExecutor
This Executor accepts a time range, package names, event types, and a count limit, then packages the query result. Activity resumed/paused events do not mean process launch/exit. Estimating usage duration also requires handling missing events, window boundaries, and multi-window behavior.

4.3 Obtain User Usage Data
- File: 1a68d982e02fc22b464693a06f528fac.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.app_usage_observer.AppUsageObserver
This registers an app-usage observer, not a permission. The screenshot attempts the hidden registerAppUsageObserver method. In Android 13, hasObserverPermission() checks system identity, device/profile-owner status, or OBSERVE_APP_USAGE. The client’s API 23 guard does not establish that this hidden method exists on every API 23 device.

5. Widget and icon Related
A reader suggested that a widget resembling an app icon could confuse “remove from home screen” with “uninstall app.” These are different operations. The screenshots below do not show a complete deceptive-uninstallation flow, and I did not encounter the case myself, so this remains a hypothesis.
5.1. Add Widget on Vivo Phones
- File: f9b6b139-4516-4ac2-896d-8bc3eb1f2d03.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.vivo_widget.VivoAddWidgetExecutor
The screenshot constructs and attempts to launch a Vivo Launcher widget-adding Activity. Component access, any user confirmation, and the final result are not shown.

5.2 Obtain icon related information
- File: da60112a4b2848adba2ac11f412cccc7.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.get_icon_info.GetIconInfoExecutor
The visible fragment queries a Launcher Provider for folder-related state. Its right side is cropped, so this image alone cannot establish the full row/column query or the eventual use of the data. Why collect this home-screen information? I could not work that out either.

5.3 Add Widget on Oppo Phones
- File: 75dcc8ea-d0f9-4222-b8dd-2a83444f9cd6.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.oppoaddwidget.OppoAddWidgetExecutor
Only conditional dispatch to a proxy or widget executor is visible; the widget-adding flow is not shown.

5.4 Update icon on Xiaomi Phones?
- File: 5d372522-b6a4-4c1b-a0b4-8114d342e6c0.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.xm_akasha.XmAkashaExecutor
The screenshot dispatches requests to helpers for shortcut permission, icon queries/updates, and restarting the Launcher. It establishes the branch names, not successful execution of each helper. Perhaps someone familiar with the Xiaomi implementation can shed some light on it.

6. Auto-start, Associated Start, Keep Alive Related
6.1 Open Auto-start on Oppo Phones
- File: e723d560-c2ee-461e-b2a1-96f85b614f2b.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.oppo_boot_perm.OppoBootPermExecutor
The screenshot references a ColorOS/OPlus security-center Provider and startup-related parameters. Writes and their effects depend on the version’s Provider checks; they do not imply removal of every background-execution restriction.


6.2 Open Vivo Associated Start Permission
- File: 8b56d820-cac2-4ca0-8a3a-1083c5cca7ae.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.vivo_association_start.VivoAssociationStartExecutor
The screenshot targets a Vivo associated-start allowlist configuration, not a general Android permission interface.
The code below constructs an XML node. That shows the proposed data structure, not that the file was written or reloaded by the system.

6.3 Huawei Power-Management Configuration
- File: 7c6e6702-e461-4315-8631-eee246aeba95.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.hw_hide_power_window.HidePowerWindowExecutor
The screenshots show power-management database/table names and cache-file cleanup. The original heading overstates this as turning off the power manager: these fragments do not prove that the entire feature, let alone thermal controls, was disabled. Anyone who works on this part of the Huawei system is welcome to take a look.


6.4 Vivo AMS Configuration Recovery
- File: 7877ec6850344e7aad5fdd57f6abf238.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.vivo_get_loc.VivoGetLocExecutor
The screenshots show recovery logic for a Vivo AMS configuration file and calls to a vendor daemon. I wondered whether this was for keeping the app alive, but without the complete call chain and results I cannot confirm that. The class name’s get_loc also does not establish location collection. Perhaps someone familiar with Vivo can help here.


7. Installation and Uninstallation Related
7.1 VivoRollbackUninstallExecutor and Launcher Configuration
- File: d643e0f9a68342bc8403a69e7ee877a7.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.vivo_rollback_uninstall.VivoRollbackUninstallExecutor
The screenshot shows downloading and replacing a Launcher configuration file and checking its digest. It does not show installing an older APK after uninstallation. The original “rollback to the preinstalled version” explanation was unverified and should not be equated with ordinary removal of a system-app update.
7.2 Vivo Phone App Uninstallation
- File: be7a2b643d7e8543f49994ffeb0ee0b6.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.vivo_official_uninstall.OfficialUntiUninstallV3
This also shows Launcher configuration replacement. An Uninstall class name is insufficient to establish its effect on the uninstall flow.
7.3 Vivo Phone App Uninstallation Related
- File: 183bb87aa7d744a195741ce524577dd0.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.vivo_official_uninstall.VivoOfficialUninstallExecutor
Only package-dependent dispatch to different helpers is visible here; the complete uninstall-related behavior is not shown.
Others
SyncExecutor
- File: f4247da0-6274-44eb-859a-b4c35ec0dd71.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.sync.SyncExecutor
I could not tell what this was for. The screenshot reads sid from input, calls CmdHandler.setSid and Utils.updateSid, then constructs version, state, and process-ID response fields. Without updateSid, this sid cannot be identified as a user identity or system UID.

UdParseNotifyMessageExecutor
- File: f35735a5cbf445c785237797138d246a.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.ud_parse_nmessage.UdParseNotifyMessageExecutor
The screenshot parses a supplied Intent’s extras and processes Parcelable values. Its caller determines where the Intent came from and whether it represents a remote notification; the class name alone cannot establish that.
6.3 TDLogcatExecutor
- File
- 8aeb045fad9343acbbd1a26998b6485a.dex
- 2aa151e2cfa04acb8fb96e523807ca6b.dex
- Class Name
- com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.td.logcat.TDLogcatExecutor
- com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.td.logcat.TDLogcatExecutor
I was unsure about this one too: it looked a bit like keep-alive code, but not quite. The visible fragment mainly checks initialization state and whether the target package remains installed before calling another method. Logging, keep-alive behavior, or other purposes require that implementation to be examined.
6.4 QueryLBSInfoExecutor
- File: 74168acd-14b4-4ff8-842e-f92b794d7abf.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.query_lbs_info.QueryLBSInfoExecutor
The screenshot reads the current Wi-Fi SSID and BSSID, not GPS coordinates. These fields can inform location inference but are not a direct location result. The WifiInfo documentation also describes permission-based redaction and unknown values for location-sensitive fields.

6.5 WriteSettingsExecutor
- File: 6afc90e406bf46e4a29956aabcdfe004.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.write_settings.WriteSettingsExecutor
The screenshot selects a Settings namespace and a putInt, putString, or similar method from parameters; actual keys and values are absent. Writing Settings.System and modifying restricted Settings.Secure entries involve different authority. Finding a put method does not allow arbitrary settings changes. See System.canWrite (API 23) and Settings.Secure.

6.6 OppoSettingExecutor
- File: 61517b68-7c09-4021-9aaa-cdebeb9549f2.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.opposettingproxy.OppoSettingExecutor
After a service connection, the screenshot sends a Messenger message containing plugin configuration. Server-side loading, execution, and authorization are absent, so the resulting settings changes or keep-alive effects remain unknown. What does this proxy do on the other end? Someone familiar with Oppo may be able to explain it.

6.7 CheckAsterExecutor
- File: 561341f5f7976e13efce7491887f1306.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.check_aster.CheckAsterExecutor
Check aster—what exactly is it checking? I do not know either. The visible code places the input uuid into tracking fields and constructs a success response. It does not show a specific Aster check, so the name cannot supply a missing detection result.

6.8 OppoCommunityIdExecutor
- File: 538278f3-9f68-4fce-be10-12635b9640b2.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.oppo_community_id.OppoCommunityIdExecutor
The screenshot attempts a vendor backup call targeting a preferences file in the Oppo community app whose name refers to a logged-in user ID. Neither file contents nor a successful backup are shown; this is not evidence of obtaining the phone user’s system identity.

6.9 GetSettingsUsernameExecutor
- File: 4569a29c-b5a8-4dcf-a3a6-0a2f0bfdd493.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.oppo_get_settings_username.GetSettingsUsernameExecutor
The screenshot reads an input-specified file of at most 10 KiB, places it in an xml response field, and labels the package as Settings. Without its contents, username cannot be resolved to an account name, display name, or another field.

6.10 LogcatExecutor
- File: 218a37ea-710d-49cb-b872-2a47a1115c69.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.logcat.LogcatExecutor
The screenshot passes page, line-count, and timeout parameters to an asynchronous log-capture helper. It neither guarantees system-wide log access nor proves completion; the visible success response follows the asynchronous call.
6.11 VivoBrowserSettingsExecutor
- File: 136d4651-df47-41b4-bb80-2ec0ab1bc775.dex
- Class Name: com.google.android.sd.biz_dynamic_dex.vivo_browser_settings.VivoBrowserSettingsExecutor
The screenshot handles a vendor-specific Vivo settings field through work/recover branches. Its consumer and later effects are not shown; it does not establish browser-history access or changes to all browser settings.

Comments area is more exciting than the article
The following reader comments are retained from 2023 as opinions and discussion, not technical evidence of exploit reproduction, data collection, or platform security rankings.
WeChat Official Account Comment Area









Zhihu Comment Area
The Zhihu answer has been deleted. I can see it through the homepage, but clicking in shows it has been deleted: How to evaluate Pinduoduo suspected of using vulnerabilities to attack user mobile phones, steal competitor software data, and prevent itself from being uninstalled? - Gracker’s answer - Zhihu https://www.zhihu.com/question/587624599/answer/2927765317
















Which is more secure, iOS or Android?
The original article referred to a comment by sunwear, but its image is missing from the archive and the original wording cannot be restored. A comment and this set of historical Android samples cannot establish which platform is “more secure.” A comparison needs defined devices, OS versions, security patches, attacker capabilities, and protected data. This article has no corresponding iOS samples or comparative experiment, so it makes no platform ranking.
About Me && Blog
Below are personal introduction and related links. I hope to communicate more with everyone in the industry. If three people walk together, there must be one who can be my teacher!
- Blogger Personal Introduction: There are personal WeChat and WeChat group links inside.
- This Blog Content Navigation: A navigation of personal blog content.
- Excellent blog articles organized and collected by individuals - A must-know for Android efficiency optimization: Everyone is welcome to recommend themselves and recommend others (WeChat private chat is fine)
- Android Performance Optimization Knowledge Planet: The paid community stopped operating in 2026 and no longer accepts new members; this link preserves its history.
One person can go faster, a group of people can go further
